FRED E. INBAU: "THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING GUILTY"* YALE KAMISAR** "The scholar may lose himself in schools, in words and become a pedant; but when he comprehends his duties, he above all men is a realist."
-Emerson
I
As fate would have it, Fred Inbau graduated from law school in 1932, the very year that, "for practical purposes the modern law of con-*[Another] general trend has been the Burger Court's concern with what I call the importance of being guilty.... From the defense point of view this means that in the argument of a case at the appellate level it is extraordinarily important today, as it really was not in the 1969's, to try to establish for the client a tolerable claim of innocence. Looking at the same litigation from the State's point of view, the State representative in appellate litigation today should be clear in arguing that regardless of what occurred in the proceedings, the individual defendant before the court is a guilty individual .... That kind of argument is likely to be persuasive with the Burger Court in a way that it clearly would not have been with the Warren Court. Whitebread, Trends in Constitutional Law: A Forecast, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 9-1 (National College of District Attorneys ed. 1977) . See also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 142 (1970) .
The argument that "the individual defendant before the court is a guilty individual" can carry only so far. That it did not prevail in the recent case of Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 Ct. (1977 , hardly refutes Professor Whitebread's point. If anything, the fact that "Williams is guilty of the savage murder of a small child; no member of the Court contends that he is not," id. at 1248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), persuaded, or helped persuade, four Justices to uphold the admissibility of the confession in the face of "so clear a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as here occurred," id. at 1248 (Stewart, J., majority opinion) tends to support Whitebread's view.
Inbau, of course, would have no trouble at all upholding Williams' confession. Indeed, the detective's "Christian burial speech" (" [Y] ou yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is..: I feel [that the parents] should be entitled to a Christian burial for [their] little girl [and that] we should stop and locate it on the way... ") stitutional criminal procedure [began] , with the decision in the great case of Powell v. Alabama."I In "the 'stone age' of American criminal procereads like an Inbau hypothetical. The "speech" would only get results if Williams were guilty; it "did not, and was not likely to, jeopardize the fairness of [Williams'] trial or in any way risk the conviction of an innocent man" 97 S. Ct. at 1259 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). And Inbau's "test of confession admissibility" has long been:
"
Is what I am about to do or say apt to make an innocent person confess?"
If the answer to the above question is "No," the interrogator should go ahead and do or say whatever was contemplated ....
In our judgment this is the only understandable test of confession admissibility.... Moreover, it is also the only test that is fair both to the public and to the accused.... 2 Inbau began his long fight to shape or to retain rules that "make sense in the light of a policeman's task," 3 more aware than most that so long as the rules do so, "we will be in a stronger position to insist that [the officer] obey them." 4 Inbau was a pioneer in American constitutional criminal procedure and something of a prophet. He discerned events in their beginnings, he foresaw what was coming and he forewarned others. This is evident in his 1942 book, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation, 5 where he sought to classify the kinds of cajolery and deception to which the police interrogator might and must not resort-and to explain why-an issue which at this late date is still "largely unresolved. 66 (1957) . 4 Id. But Inbau also told the police, very early in his career, that they themselves "must share a large portion of the blame for the unfortunate practical result of decisions such as those in the McNabb [case] . Known instances of miscarriages of justice resulting from the use of force and threats in obtaining confessions have rightfully induced the courts to view with caution all criminal confessions. Better interrogation practices on the part of the police profession as a whole would undoubtedly result in sounder and more practical legal decisions involving criminal confessions." Inbau, The Courts on Confessions, THE POLICE DIGEST, Dec. 1943, at 13, 15 . 119-33 (1st ed. 1942) .
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H. UVILLER, THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INVESTIGATION 569 (1974) . "Oddly," notes Professor Uviller, "the few [post-Miranda] lower court decisions addressing deception in interrogation seem reluctant to forbid all forms of misrepresentation, particularly [when] neither shocking nor of the sort which creates the hazard that the innocent suspect might be induced to confess falsely." Id. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (admitting a confession in a preMiranda case although the police had falsely told the defendant that another had confessed and had also "sympathetically" suggested that the victim's homosexual advances may have started the fight). See also Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) Inbau's pioneering spirit was also evident in his very first classes at the Northwestern University School of Law. So one of his most illustrious students, Frank Allen, himself a great explorer and early pathfinder in this field, has often told me. Inbau wrung dry the relatively few Supreme Court cases then on the books, perceiving and fretting over all their "dangerous" implications. Long before there were any courses or casebooks bearing that title, Inbau taught criminal procedure and its constitutional dimensions-all the while he yearned for, and fought for, the day when criminal procedure would have no (or at least very few) constitutional dimensions.
How did his students receive him? How did the world receive him? Inbau is -well, Inbau. In the classroom, no less than outside, he was (depending upon your point of view), amusing or exasperating, sensible or outrageous, inspiring or infuriating. Whatever the various reactions he engenders, how6ver, I doubt that any of his students could forget him or his subject matter or how deeply he cared about it. Many of his students, hopefully, were less impressed than he with "the importance of being guilty," but (long before this could be said of most law faculties) all of his students, happily, were bound to be impressed with the importance of constitutional criminal procedure.
McNabb (1943) Biron was questioned by members of the homicide division of the Minneapolis police department. The decision to tape record the questioning was not made with the intent to offer the tape in evidence (or with any expectation that it would wind up in evidence), but on the premise that the suspect would "crack" quickly and that the playing of Biron's taped confession to his accomplices would lead them to do likewise. But Biron "held out" longer than expected and various detectives took turns questioning him, some of whom did not know they were on tape.
Biron's defense lawyer somehow learned that a tape of his client's police interrogation existed and when a member of the homicide division so admitted, the tape was put into evidence. Copies are on file in the University of Minnesota and University of Michigan law libraries.
The five detectives who questioned Biron at one time or another were veteran interrogators. Shortly thereafter, one of them became head of the police department. Some of their tactics, such as those the Minnesota Supreme Court held invalidated Biron's confession, would be sharply condemned by Inbau, e.g., the misrepresentation that despite the fact Biron was slightly "over-age" he might be treated as a juvenile offender if he "cooperates." As the extracts in the next footnote illustrate, however, many of their interrogation techniques were recommended by the standard manuals, e.g., keeping the "subject" on the defensive, displaying an air of confidence in the "subject's" guilt, stressing the futility of resistance, sympathizing with the offender, and minimizing the moral seriousness of his offense. See the discussion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-55 (1966 There is no reason to think that the tactics employed by Biron's experienced interrogators were any different than those they had utilized in scores of other cases over the years. So far as I know, this was the only "confession" they ever lost (at least up to that point), and it was also the only time a tape of their interrogation appeared in the record. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed Biron's conviction on the ground that false legal advice vitiated the confession. The court never suggested that the gnawing police questioning might be inherently coercive or inherently violative of Biron's right to counsel or the privilege against self-incrimination; indeed it repeatedly referred to the interrogation sessions as "interviews." On this latter point, see note 24 infra.
tors questioned him "in relays"; that "they became so tired they were compelled to rest.
2 1 I venture to say that if there had been a tape recording of the Ashcraft interrogation and the Justices had listened to it in a "hearing room" set up for that purpose, long before the tape had ended they would have rushed out the door aghast-or staggered out, in a nearcatatonic state.
Maybe not. Maybe Justice Jackson, for one, would have stayed there, to the bitter end, pondering: "Did Ashcraft do it? Did he kill his wife?"
There is reason to think Ashcraft did. The man he named as his wife's killer reminded him that he did not intend to take the entire blame, promptly admitted the killing and accused Ashcraft of hiring him to do the job. After the interrogation, when examined by his family physician, Ashcraft neither complained of his treatment nor avowed his innocence.
Instead he made what this friendly doctor described as an "entirely voluntary" statement explaining why he had killed his wife .
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Ashcraft is a great case only because Jackson's dissent made it so. The dissent is worth quoting at length. No piece of writing by Jackson better illustrates this self-described "country lawyer's" famed powers of advocacy and his "extraordinary quality of freshness and directness of approach." ' ' And no opinion by any judge, I think, better captures both the style and substance of Inbau's views on police interrogation and confessions:
Interrogation per se is not, while violence per se is, an outlaw. Questioning is an indispensable instrumentality of justice. It may be abused, of course, as cross-examination in court may be abused, but the principles by which we may adjudge when it passes constitutional limits are quite different from those that condemn police brutality, and are far more difficult to apply. And they call for a more responsible and cautious exercise of our office. For ... we cannot read an undiscriminating hostility to mere interrogation into the Constitution without unduly fettering the States in protecting society from the criminal.
It probably is the normal instinct to deny and conceal any shameful or guilty act. Even a "voluntary confession" is not likely to be the product of the same motives with which one may volunteer information that does not incriminate or concern him. The term "voluntary" confession does not mean voluntary in the sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one's soul of a sense of guilt. "Voluntary confessions" in criminal law are the product of calculations of a different order, and usually proceed from a belief that further denial is useless and perhaps prejudicial. To speak of any confessions of crime made after arrest as being "voluntary" or "uncoerced" is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional.
A confession is wholly and uncontestably voluntary only if a guilty person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser. The Court bases its decision on the premise that custody and examination of a prisoner for thirty-six hours is "inherently coercive." Of course it is. And so is custody and examination for one hour. Arrest itself is inherently coercive, and so is detention ....
But does the Constitution prohibit use of all confessions made after arrest because questioning, while one is deprived of freedom, is "inherently coercive"?...
That the inquiry was prolonged and persistent is a factor that in any calculation of its effect on Ashcraft would count heavily against the confession. But some men would withstand for days pressures that would destroy the will of others in hours. Always heretofore the ultimate question has been whether the confessor was in possession of his own will and self-control at the time of confession .... This evidence shows that despite the "inherent coerciveness" of the circumstances of his examination, the confession when made was deliberate, free, and voluntary in the sense in which that term is used in criminal law. This Court could not, in our opinion, hold this confession an involuntary one except by substituting its presumption in place of analysis of the evidence and refusing to weigh the evidence even in rebuttal of its presumption.
I am not sure whether the Court denies the State all right to arrest and question the husband of the slain woman. No investigation worthy of the name could fail to examine him. Of all persons, he was most likely to know whether she had enemies or rivals ....
Could the State not confront Ashcraft with his false statements and ask his explanation? He did not throw himself at any time on his rights, refuse to answer, and demand counsel, even according to his own testimony. The strategy of the officers evidently was to keep him talking, to give him plenty of rope and see if he would not hang himself. He does not claim to have made objection to this. Instead he relied on his wits. The time came when it dawned on him that his own story brought him under suspicion, and that he could not meet it. Must the officers stop at this point because he was coming to appreciate the uselessness of deception?
Then he became desperate and accused [Ware] . Certainly from this point the State was justified in holding and questioning him as a witness, for he claimed to know the killer. That accusation backfired and only turned up a witness against him. He had run out of expedients and invention; he knew he had lost the battle of wits. After all, honesty seemed to be the best, even if the last, policy. He confessed in detail.
At what point in all this investigation does the Court hold that the Constitution commands these officers to send Ashcraft on his way and give up the murder as insoluble? If the State is denied the right to apply any pressure to him which is 'inherently coercive' it could hardly deprive him of his freedom at all. Of course, few advocates of any position are able to eschew emotive language. See, e.g., THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 2-3 (H. Simmons & J. Califano ed. 1976) ("gag" orders vs. "protective" orders; "national security" vs. "the right of the public to know"). Critics of police interrogation do use threatening and perjorative terms, but defenders of the system are no slouches themselves in the art of wordsmanship. The Justice Black, who wrote the opinion for the Court in Ashcraft, no less than Justice Jackson, who authored the ringing dissent, knew full well that in 1944 neither the Court nor "the country" was "ready" for an affirmative answer to the question, " [D] oes the Constitution prohibit use of all confessions made after arrest because questioning, while one is deprived of freedom, is 'inherently coercive'?" As we now know, it was not until 1966 that the Court, if not "the country," grew "ready." ' 6 There is cause to wonder whether "the country" will ever grow "ready." And there is reason to think that the present Court is growing weary. Committee that "in the interrogation room ... you have something akin to a lawyer-client relationship, a doctor-patient relationship." 1963 Senate Hearings, supra at 286, 294. He also pointed out that "it takes a very skillful kind of interview, a proper kind of environment, in order to establish the rapport" necessary to get a heinous offender to confess. Id. at 293. Inbau himself has likened effective police interrogation to an "unhurried interview" and sought legislative authority "for a reasonable period of police detention" for the interrogation of suspects "not unwilling to be interviewed. Rev. 516, 526 (1976), and there is substantial cause for viewing it as "at best a tense, temporary, ragged II It is well known, and it is quite understandable, that the forthright and occasionally irreverent Inbau is greatly admired-adored may not be too strong a word-by the thousands of law enforcement officials who flock to his "short courses" or applaud his hard-hitting speeches at their conferences and conventions. And it is also no secret, and again not surprising, that many of his fellow law professors do not hold him in the same regard.
Inbau is an expert, make no mistake about that, but he is an expert with a maverick strain. He was, and always will be, the spokesman for the plain man, no less than for the police officer and the prosecutor. But the typical expert does not understand the plain man. "What he knows, he knows so thoroughly that he is impatient with men to whom it has to be explained." ' The typical expert "lacks contact with the plain man. He not only does not know what the plain man is thinking; he rarely knows how to discover his thoughts. He has dwelt so austerely in his laboratory or his study that the content of the average mind is a closed book to Several months ago I received a notice from the Internal Revenue Service to come to its Chicago office to explain a couple of business expense deductions. One related to a deduction for "an office in home." That referred to a deduction I listed for 1/6 of my apartment rent -for a sizeable den used exclusively for my book writings and various other writings, which, incidentally, account for a third of my total income.
It seemed odd that there should be any question about this. It also seemed odd that any question would be raised as to the other modest items of expense charged against these extracurricular income producing activities.
Anyway, I spent several hours locating checks and records to substantiate these deductionstime I would have preferred to use in writing new books or articles. I also appeared in the IRS office at the designated time of 9:30 A.M. I sat in a waiting room for my name to be called -all the while feeling like a charity patient in a health clinic. At 10:05 my name was called, and as I walked by, some of the other assembled suspects, one of them -whom I did not know but who obviously knew me -exclaimed: "Inbau; you too!"
This was not an exhilarating experience, I assure you. Nor did I enjoy baring my financial soul to the young lady who grilled me for about twenty minutes.
I hasten to relieve you of any concern over my future; I was "exonerated"; my return was approved.
The various tax reports and various other kinds of reports which a business man has to make to the Federal and State Governments require many disclosures of a private nature and a failure to disclose may incur severe penalties or even a discontinuance of the business itself. Safety and health inspectors of businesses call for privacy intrusions. In the labor relations area, a company has to subject itself to a lot of disclosures, and to the demands of labor unions -privacy invasions, they may be fairly called.
Those Inbau takes strong positions and is given to strong words. On occasion, he is even known to have voiced rage and indignation. These qualities are not calculated to enhance his status in the law teaching ranks. Professors, it seems, are supposed to tiptoe, not crash. They are supposed to be troubled and tentative, not take very strong and very clear positions on anything (except, perhaps, right down the middle). Their stock in trade is not supplying answers but asking questions (and criticizing others who have the audacity to propose solutions). They earn points, it seems, by showing how agonizingly subtle and complex an issue or a problem actually is, not by suggesting how simple it might really be. 45 The safe course for a law professor, it seems, is to set forth all imaginable arguments (or, better yet, some unimaginable ones, too) on both sides (or better yet, on four or five sides), lament the lack of sufficient data, deplore the "single-minded thinking" which has characterized the field (and probably add that it has generated "much heat but little light"), recognize that valid principles are "in collision," stress that there are no "absolutes," and wind up troubled (or, better yet, tortured and paralyzed) by doubts and uncertainties. The preferred model, in short, is Tevye the dairyman:
... On the other hand, what kind of match would that be, with a poor tailor? On the other hand, he's an honest, hard worker. On the other hand, he has absolutely nothing. On the other hand, things could never get worse for him, they could only get better. Hopefully, those who arrive at strong conclusions engage in "on the one hand-on the other handbut on the other hand" thinking somewhere along the Although Inbau is well aware that his views, and his colorful manner of expressing them, might irritate, even infuriate, his fellow law professors, this has not swayed him from his course. 47 Indeed, one of his missions, as he sees it, is to straighten out "the mess" the law professors, ex-law professors on the bench, and other "sensitive souls" have gotten us into. 4 8 way. It seems, however, that the preferred style is not to do so before the speech is delivered or the article is published, but "out loud" in one's speech or article-better yet, perhaps, in one's conclusions. 47 In an "editorial," "Playing God": 5 to 4, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 377-78 (1966) , Inbau, then Editorin-Chief of the Journal, ripped into "the Court's one man majority" for continuing to "play God" when the ALI, ABA, various governmental commissions and other groups were:
seeking to find a proximate solution to some very difficult problems .... But a one-man majority of the Court in Miranda "pulled the rug" from underneath all of these studies and research groups, and effectively foreclosed a final evaluation of their ultimate findings and recommendations .... Considering the complexity of the interrogation-confession problem, a summary 5 to 4 nullification of much of the aforementioned group efforts . . . is awesomely inconsistent with fundamental democratic concepts. It's more like "Playing God: 5 to 4." A year and a half later, Inbau took cognizance of the fact that his "Playing God" editorial had "infuriated many of my colleagues in the law school world," but " [w] hat I said then may be appropriately repeated now, although I regret whatever infuriation it may again arouse among my law professor colleagues who may be in the audience tonight." Unpublished address by Fred E. Inbau, "Crime and the Supreme Court," Symposium by the Council of Graduate Students, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, (April 24, 1968) (on file in the law libraries of Northwestern University and the University of Michigan). Inbau (who stressed at the outset that he did not appear 'just" in "his capacity" as a law professor, but as one with much "practical experience") "explained" how the McNabb innovation came about:
Unfortunately the United States Supreme Court, and it was made up at that time of some even more sensitive souls than we see, perhaps at the present time-there were some law professors on it, ex-law professors-and they assumed that these practices which were revealed in these [coerced confession) decisions were commonplace, they were universal, and the Court, acting in that feeling of resentment, laid down in the McNabb case its so-called civilized standards rule.
1977]
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Inbau came to the podium from the crime lab, the interrogation room and the trial courts, 49 not the library. Not only was he a pioneer in the development of the polygraph and in the "psychology" of obtaining confessions, but in his younger days he had been the premier lie-detector examiner and just about the craftiest interrogator around. In the course of obtaining hiundreds of confessions, he had been known to spill over with such "sympathy" for a murder suspect that he had had to "pause to wipe away a tear." 5 ' He prefers to represent himself (and perhaps think of himself) as a "practical man" rather than a "law professor." 51 Most professors (and too many judges), I think he would say, are "too naive and otherworldly to intervene in a brass-knuckle world. '52 If Inbau much cared about how his brethren in the law teaching ranks regard him, however, I think he would be puzzled by the "chilling" effect of his strong positions and strong words. I think it is a serious mistake to say that when we ask for an interrogation opportunity on the part of the police we are asking for the abolition of the privilege against self-incrimination. Unfortunately, Justice Goldberg made the same error in his opinion in the Escobedo case. If you recall, ... he quotes Dean Wigmore's reasons in support of the privilege [378 U.S. at 489, quoting from 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 309 (3d ed. 1940)] and then equates that with his approval of the exclusionary rule and the present rules with respect to confession admissibility. Justice Goldberg, I think, should have known better. He was a student of Wigmore's. And Wigmore's treatise very clearly indicates his violent opposition to the exclusionary rule and to any rule of confession admissibility other than one based upon the trustworthiness factor.
I not only know that from Wigmore's writings, but I knew the gentleman very well.... I am quite sure he would be greatly disturbed to ners, when he thought the occasion demanded it, "the Colonel" could strike with the force of an army mule (or the "bite" of a first sergeant),u yet this did not prevent him from being acclaimed as "our first legal scholar." 56 Indeed, Wigmore's Treatise on Evidence, "unrivaled as the greatest treatise on any single subject of the law, ' 5 7 contains a generous amount of scathing, colorful criticism of the courts -oftenfor the very reasons that Inbau has never stopped reproaching them:
Does the illegal source of a piece of evidence taint it so as to exclude it, when offered by the party who has shared in the illegality?
...
An employer may perhaps suitably interrupt the course of his business to deliver a homily to his office-boy on the evils of gambling or the rewards of industry. But a judge does not hold court in a streetcar to do summary justice upon a fellow-passenger who fraudulently evades payment of his fare; and, upon the same principle, he does not attempt, in the course of a specific litigation, to investigate and punish all offences which incidentally cross the path of that litigation. Such a practice might be consistent with the primitive system of justice under an Arabian sheikh; but it does not comport with our own system of law. 58 see himself quoted in the Escobedo case as though he were supporting that viewpoint. As I read the 130-page discussion of confessions in volume 3 of the Treatise on Evidence, a volume to which the Escobedo opinion never refers, Inbau is plainly right about Wigmore. See 3 J. WIGMORE § § 22-24, 826, 841-43, 856-59, 865, 867 (3d. ed. 1940) . 54 Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore-Scholar and Reformer, 53J. CRIM. L.C. & P. S. 277, 280 (1962) .
55 In addition to the examples furnished by Roalfe, supra note 54, see especially Wigmore, Abrams v. War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539 (1920) (blistering attack on Holmes-Brandeis position). See also note 57 infra and text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in
58 Kocourek, John Henry Wigmore, 27 AM. JUD. Soc'y 122, 124 (1943) . [T]he heretical influence of Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) , establishing the exclusionary rule in federal search and seizure cases] spread, and evoked a contagion of sentimentality in some of the State Courts, inducing them to break loose from long-settled fundamentals.
... After the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment and its auxiliary legislation, prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, a new and popular occasion was afforded for the misplaced invocation of this principle; and the judicial excesses of many Courts in sanctioning its use give an impression of easy complaisance which would be ludicrous if it were not so dangerous to the general respect for law and order in the community.
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... If the officials, illegally searching, came across an infernal machine, planned for the city's destruction, and impounded it, shall we say that the diabolical owner of it may appear in court, brazenly demand process for its return, and be supinely accorded by the Court a writ of restitution, with perhaps on apology for the "outrage"? Such is the logical consequence of the doctrine of Weeks v. U.S....
[T]he essential fallacy of [Weeks] and its successors is that it virtually creates a novel exception, where the Fourth Amendment is involved, to the fundamental principle ... that an illegality in the mode of procuring evidence is no ground for excluding it. The doctrine of such an exception rests on a reverence for the Fourth Amendment so deep and cogent that its violation will be taken notice of, at any cost of other justice, and even in the most indirect way....
[This view] puts Supreme Courts in the position of assisting to undermine the foundations of the very institutions they are set there to protect. It regards the over-zealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the community than the unpunished murderer or embezzler or panderer.
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... Holmes, J., in his dissent [in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) ] refers to this act of wiretapping as "dirty business." But so is likely to be all apprehension of malefactors. Kicking a man in the stomach is "dirty business," normally viewed. But if a gunman assails you, and you know enough of the French art of "savatage" to kick him in the stomach and thus save your life, is that "dirty business" for you? . Claude Sowle, another former Inbau student and then Inbau's junior colleague on the Northwestern Law Faculty, gave a stirring talk, striking at the heart of Inbau's position on police interrogation and confessions. He attacked the hypocrisy pervading the criminal justice system; measured the proceedings in the "interrogation" room against the standard of a public trial and found the former sorely wanting-indeed, based upon nullification of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to the assistance of counsel-and spelled out how all too often the "legal courts" are reduced to the position of merely ratifying the verdict obtained by the police-conducted "outlaw tribunals." Sowle's remarks had a stunning impact on the audience and inspired me, some years later, to write my "Gatehouses and Mansions" paper.
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While Sowle was speaking, I studied Inbau closely. I half expected him to shout, "That's enough, Claude!" Instead, Inbau seemed to be basking in the brilliance and independence of his junior colleague. He seemed pleased that Sowle had the rapt attention of the audience, especially the many police officers in attendance.
Another speaker, Bernard Weisberg, also attacked the Inbau position. The contention that all statements made after a suspect's request to contact counsel has been denied should be barred on that ground alone had been rejected in Crooker, the Court maintaining that such a rule "would effectively preclude police 65 Some years later, then Assistant Professor Thompson spelled out his views on the subject in questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused was afforded opportunity to call his attorney. 67 Inbau, of course, applauded this stand. But Weisberg argued most persuasively that in the real world "fair" or "proper" or "reasonable" police questioning was virtually non-existent-and he quoted extensively from Inbau's interrogation manual to make his point. Moreover, pointed out Weisberg, even if the courts could decide when "reasonable" interrogation had come to an end (which he doubted), they could not hope to do so unless full records of these essentially unsupervised proceedings were available for review-and they almost never were.
Weisberg's remarks infuriated many of the police in attendance. One captain leaped to his feet and growled at Weisberg that someone who had never conducted an interrogation himself had no business talking about the subject-and couldn't have anything worthwhile to say. Inbau rushed to the microphone. A good argument could be made, he smiled, that only someone who had been on the receiving end of a police interrogation was qualified to talk about the subject. He had neglected to invite such a person, but Weisberg, he suggested, was the next best thing. Weisberg was a thoughtful, articulate spokesman for the accused. True, evidently Weisberg believed that the established practice of police questioning was fundamentally and hopelessly irreconcilable with the adversary system of justice and the Constitution, but so did some members of the Supreme Court. Some day-and not in the too distant future-Weisberg's views might command a majority of the Court. A major purpose of the conference, Inbau reminded the many police officers in the audience, was not just to entertain them with speakers they liked to hear, but to present speakers who would tell them what they ought to know and had to think about. (This, I asked 69 Of all the contributors to this "International Conference on Criminal Law," Weisberg's criminal justice credentials were the least impressive. He had no law enforcement background. He was a general practitioner, engaged mostly in corporate and business law. But Inbau had "discovered" Weisberg when the latter had co-authored a 1959 report by the Illinois Division of the ACLU, sity and the University of Michigan). He had told a group of police officers:
Too often there is the tendency on the part of the police to criticize all that the courts doto label as technicalities the reasons given for any particular case decision that the individual police officer dislikes. There are times, to be sure, when that is true. But there are many times when the reasons are substantial and basically valid ....
As a police officer you may feel that the courts should leave you alone in your efforts to enforce the law, to apprehend criminals and to protect the public. Many courts would also like to be left alone to do as they please. Many legislators would also like to be left alone and unchecked. Many members of the executive branch . . . would also like to function as they please. But in a democratic system, no branch of government, can be permitted to exercise unbridled authority and power....
In any democratic society individual rights and liberties must be preserved and we are willing to do so at the expense of efficiency in government itself. To relate this principle to your situation, let me put it this way. We would rather that some criminals escape detection and punishment-even though you, as a police officer, know positively he is guilty-rather than sacrifice or even jeopardize the rights and liberties of the great mass of individuals who make up this democratic society of ours. This concept is essential. Secret Detention by Chicago Police-and he had given him a wide stage.
Weisberg had the advantages of the amateur-"the freedom from traditional limitations and perspectives, the ability to raise fundamental questions which professionals in the field have long since forgotten to consider.
' 70 When he came to examine police interrogation, Weisberg was astounded by the virtually unbridled discretionary powers wielded by the "administrative agencies" (police departments) and "administrative officials" (police officers) in this field and by their ability "to prevent objective recordation of the facts":
The modern police function of preliminary criminal investigation and interrogation of suspects is an unusual instance of discretionary administrative power over persons unregulated by judicial standards.... In large measure police station questioning ... is governed only by the self-imposed restraints of the police and by limited judicial action in the small number of cases in which police conduct becomes a litigated issue.
Whatever the reasons for their circumspection, the failure of the courts to assume supervisory powers over police interrogation practices remains an anomaly. It is sometimes grounded on the American separation of judicial and executive powers. But this doctrine has not prevented the courts from developing judicial standards for other administrative agencies.
Measured by legal standards, the most unique feature of the police station questioning is its characteristic secrecy. It is secrecy which creates the risk of abuses, which by keeping the record incomplete makes the rules about coercion vague and difficult to apply, which inhibits the development of clear rules to govern police interrogation and which contributes to public distrust of the police. Secrecy is not the same as the privacy which interrogation specialists insist is necessary for effective questioning. Inconspicuous recording equipment or concealed observers would not detract from the intimacy between the interrogator and his subject which is said to increase the likelihood of confession.
No other case comes to mind in which an administrative official is permitted the broad discretionary power assumed by the police interrogator, together with the power to prevent objective recordation of the facts.... It is secrecy, not privacy, which accounts for the absence of a reliable record of interrogation proceedings in a police station. So far as I know, Weisberg was the first law review writer to make extensive use of the interrogation manuals. And, as I have suggested elsewhere, each of these manuals may have been "equal to a dozen law review articles in its impact on the Court. '75 For "one of the 71 Weisbergsupra note 69, at 44-45. Of course, Weisberg's criticism of the old "voluntariness" test applies to Miranda as well, at least as it has generally been applied. Although language in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, strongly suggests that, at least where feasible, the police must stenographically or, better yet, electronically record the warnings given to the suspect, as well as his response, so that they may be played back or shown to the court, "most courts have held that the testimony of an officer that he gave the warnings is sufficient and need not be corroborated." ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 140 (commentary) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1974 ).
Weisberg's extraordinary 1960 paper also anticipates and voices grave doubts about the efficacy of a system based on police-issued cautions or warnings:
[A]ny rule which requires a caution inevitably invites avoidance. Even if it is tied to an objective event such as the commencement of interrogation or the time of arrest, the probable conflict of testimony about whether a required caution was in fact given makes satisfactory judicial enforcement doubtful. Any rule requiring a warning is also likely to be ineffectual since the significance and effect of a warning depend primarily on emphasis and the spirit in which it was given. A warning can easily become a meaningless ritual .... The notion that [the interrogator] should precede questioning with a caution suggests that the interrogator should act to protect the interests of the suspect at the same time that he is attempting to obtain damaging statements from him. But this cannot effectively substitute for the loyalty of counsel or the disinterestedness of a judge. Weisberg, supra note 69, at 40-41.
72 Weisberg, supra note 69, at 22. 7 3 Id.
all in attendance leave with their swords and banners lowered and their sensitivities raised.
As an "expert in controversy," this iconoclastic law professor, no less than the "iconoclast from Baltimore," "welcomed attacks on himself, partly because they showed that his thrusts had gone home, partly because he defended everyone's right to have his say, and partly because he felt that destructive criticism, even of his own work, was much more stimulating than acclaim ."96
Fred would be quick to deny that he is "the professor." If anything, he sees himself as the "anti-professor"-or so he says, Methinks he does protest too much. One of the Inbaus, at least, is more "the professor" than a considerable number who profess to be, more "the professor" than any of the Inbaus would ever care to admit. 90 D. Stenerson, H. L. MENCKEN: ICONOCLAST FROM BALTIMORE 226 (1971) .
